On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game by Arribillaga, Pablo R. et al.
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions
for a Generalized Assignment Game
R. Pablo Arribillagay Jordi Massóz Alejandro Nemey
October 7, 2013
Abstract: We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-
to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s assignment game.
We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al-
ternative denitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each
group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games dened
using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains
the set of payo¤ vectors associated to the two denitions of competitive
equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested
structure. Moreover, each solution can be identied with a set of ma-
trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are
distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as
solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have
the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.
Keywords: Assignment Game; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Group Stability.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: C78; D78.
The work of Arribillaga and Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San
Luis, through grant 319502, and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientícas y Técnicas
(CONICET), through grant PIP 112-200801-00655. Massó acknowledges nancial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for
Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and through grant ECO2008-0475-FEDER (Grupo
Consolidado-C), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the prize ICREA Academiafor
excellence in research and grant SGR2009-419.
yInstituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL-CONICET). Ejército de los Andes 950. 5700
San Luis, Argentina. E-mails: rarribi@unsl.edu.ar, aneme@unsl.edu.ar
zUniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE. Departament dEconomia i dHistòria
Econòmica. Edici B, UAB. 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain. E-mail: jordi.masso@uab.es
1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962) introduce ordinal two-sided matching models to study as-
signment problems between two disjoint sets of agents like men and women, buyers
and sellers, rms and workers, students and colleges, and so on. In the marriage
model, where matchings are one-to-one, each agent has to be matched to at most
an agent on the opposite set. In the college admissions model, where matchings are
many-to-one, each student has to be matched to at most a college, while each college
can be assigned to a set of students as long as its cardinality does not exceed the
number of the colleges available seats. It is assumed that each agent has strict or-
dinal preferences over the set of agents that he does not belong to plus the prospect
of remaining unmatched or, in the case of a college, over the family of all subsets of
students, identifying the empty set with the prospect of not being matched to any
student. These models are ordinal and money do not play any role; in particular,
money can not be used to compensate an agent in the case he has to be matched
to an agent (or set of agents) at the bottom of the agents preference list. Ordinal
models have been enormously useful and extensively used in Economics to study sit-
uations where the assignment problem has only one issue: who is matched to whom.1
In these models, and given a preference prole (a preference for each agent), a match-
ing is stable if it is individually rational (no agent is assigned to a partner that is
worse than to remain unmatched) and pair-wise stable (there is no pair of agents
that are not matched to each other but they would prefer to be so rather than to be
matched to the partner proposed by the matching, or to one of them if the agent is
a college). Gale and Shapley (1962) show that, for every preference prole, the set
of stable matchings is non-empty, it coincides with the Core of the associated coop-
erative game with non-transferable utility (and hence, coalitions with two or more
agents from the same set of agents do not have additional blocking power), and there
exist two stable matchings, 1 and 2; with the properties that all agents in one set
agree that the partner they receive at 1 (at 2) is the best (worst) among all partners
that they receive at any stable matching and, simultaneously, all agents in the other
set agree that the partner they receive at 2 (at 1) is the best (worst) among all
partners that they receive at any stable matching.2 Finally, they dene the deferred
acceptance algorithm to compute, depending on the set of agents that make o¤ers,
each of the two extreme stable matchings 1 and 2:
However, there are many assignment problems (solved by markets) where money
plays a signicant role; for instance, through salaries or prices. Hence, in those cases
agentspreferences may be cardinal. But then, to describe a solution of the problem
1Roth and Sotomayor (1990) contains a masterful presentation of the most relevant matching
models and some of their applications.
2Knuth (1976) shows that the set of stable matchings is a (dual) complete lattice with the
unanimous partial ordering of the agents in one set.
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(in particular, to unsure its stability) it is not su¢ cient to specify the matching
between the two sides of the market because it is also required to describe how each
pair of assigned agents share the gains of being matched to each other. Shapley and
Shubik (1972) propose the assignment game as an appropriated tool to study one-to-
one matching problems with money (i.e., with transferable utility). The prototypical
and most simple example of an assignment game is a market with sellers and buyers in
which each seller owns one indivisible unit of a good and each buyer wants to buy at
most one unit of one good. This setting di¤ers from the marriage model of Gale and
Shapley (1962) by the fact that there exists money used as a means of exchange. In
addition money is also used to determine buyersvaluations (or maximal willingness
to pay) of each unit of the available goods and sellersreservation prices (or minimal
amounts at which they are willing to sell the unit of the good they own). Shapley
and Shubik (1972) show that the assignment game has the following properties. (i)
There exists at least one competitive equilibrium price vector, with a price for each of
the goods, and an assignment between buyers and sellers such that, at those prices,
each buyer is assigned to the seller that owns the good (namely, the buyer buys the
unit of the good that the seller has, and pays its price) that gives him the maximal
net valuation (the di¤erence between his valuation and the price of the good). (ii)
The set of competitive equilibrium prices is a complete lattice (with the natural order
of vectors in an n-dimensional Euclidian space, where n is the number of goods).
(iii) The lattice structure on the set of competitive equilibrium prices is embedded
into the set of induced payo¤s (or utilities or net gains). (iv) The set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s coincides with the Core of the cooperative game with transferable
utility induced by the assignment game. And nally, (v) the Core coincides with
the set of individually rational and pair-wise stable payo¤ vectors. In this model, a
solution is not only an assignment (who buys to whom, or equivalently, who sells to
whom) but it is also a description of how each assigned pair of agents splits the gains
generated by their trade (the di¤erence between the valuation that the buyer assigns
to the good and the sellers reservation price).3
Sotomayor (1992, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011), Camiña (2006), Milgrom
(2009), Fagebaume, Gale and Sotomayor (2010), Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) and
Massó and Neme (2013) are some of the papers that extend the one-to-one Shapley
and Shubik (1972)s assignment game by allowing that buyers can buy di¤erent goods
and/or that sellers can own and sell units of di¤erent goods to di¤erent buyers. Most
of those papers show that some of the properties of the one-to-one model also hold
for the generalized versions. In particular, Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) and
3Observe that competitive equilibrium assignments are optimal in the sense that they maximize
the sum of all net gains. Thus, and since they are solutions of a linear problem, they are generi-
cally unique. The complete lattice structure of the set of stable matchings in the ordinal model is
translated to the complete lattice structure of the set of competitive payo¤ vectors in the cardinal
model.
2
Massó and Neme (2013) consider a cardinal two-sided many-to-many generalized
assignment game (a market) in which, given a set of goods, each seller may own
(and hence, may sell) several units of di¤erent goods and each buyer may buy several
units of several goods, and buyers and sellers trade indivisible units of these goods
by money. Namely, buyers pay money to sellers who deliver in exchange units of the
goods. Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) show that the set of (relevant) competitive
equilibrium price vectors is a complete lattice (with the natural order of vectors).
Hence, there exist a sellers-optimal competitive equilibrium price vector (which is
the best from the point of view of the sellers and it is the worse from the point
of view of the buyers) and a buyers-optimal competitive equilibrium price vector
(with the symmetric property). In addition, most of the previously cited papers
propose and study cooperative solution concepts that are natural in the many-to-one
or many-to-many contexts. The Core is the most studied solution concept. Given a
payo¤vector and an associated assignment (the payo¤s are obtained after distributing
among players the net gains generated from each trade specied by the assignment)
a coalition Core-blocks the payo¤ vector if all its agents, by breaking all their trades
with all agents outside the coalition, may improve upon their payo¤s by reorganizing
new trades, performed only among themselves. The Core is the set of payo¤ vectors
that are not Core-blocked by any coalition. Another group stability notion naturally
arises after giving to coalitions a stronger power to block by admitting that each
member of the blocking coalition keeps, partially or totally, some of his trades with
agents outside the coalition.4 Massó and Neme (2013) study the convergence of the
set of group stable payo¤s and the Core through a replicated sequence of markets to
the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤ vectors. They show that when the market
is replicated twice the set of group stable payo¤s already coincides with the set of
competitive equilibrium payo¤s and that when the number of replications tends to
innity the Core converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s.
However, in this setting there are other alternative notions of group stability. They
di¤er on the type of transactions that agents in a blocking coalition are allowed to
perform with agents outside. That is, the notions depend on how sale contracts have
been specied and hence, on how they can be broken. The Core concept assumes that
agents in a blocking coalition can only trade among themselves, without being able
to keep any trade with agents outside the blocking coalition; thus, when a coalition
of agents Core-blocks a proposed payo¤ vector they have to break all contracts with
agents outside the coalition. In the group stability notion dened in Massó and Neme
(2013) it is assumed that sale contracts are unit-by-unit. A trade of a unit of a good
between a buyer and a seller is performed independently of the other traded units
of the same good as well as of the traded units of the other goods. An agent of a
blocking coalition can reduce (but not increase) the trade, with members outside the
4Sotomayor (1999) introduces group stability as an alternative and more natural concept than
the Core.
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coalition, of a given good in the number of units that he wishes, but without being
forced for this reason to reduce neither the number of traded units of the same good
nor the number of units of the other goods. In this paper we consider the other two
alternative notions of group stability. They are more appropriated for those cases
where sale contracts are written good-by-good or globally. In the good-by-good case,
the sale contract between a buyer and a seller includes all traded units of only one
good, and it is independent of their trade on the other goods. Thus, when an agent
belongs to a blocking coalition and the other does not, either they keep the trade of
all units of the good specied in the sale contract or they completely eliminate the
trade of this good. In the global case, the sale contract between a buyer and a seller
includes all trades on all goods and thus, when an agent belongs to a blocking coalition
and the other does not, either they keep all trades or they have to be eliminated all
together.
Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012), when dening competitive equilibrium for this
generalized assignment game, consider that given a price vector (a price for each of the
goods) agents demand and supply those units of the goods that maximize their total
payo¤without taking into account the aggregate feasibility constraints. The supply or
demand of each agent only depends on the price vector and his individual feasibility
constraints. The fact that, at a given price vector, all supply and demand plans
are mutually compatible is an equilibrium question, rather than a restriction on the
individual maximization problems. On the other hand, the competitive equilibrium
notion studied by Sotomayor (2007, 2009 and 2011) in related models assume that
individual demands and supplies have to be feasible for the market. Agents, to be
able to formulate their demands or supplies at a given price vector, have to know all
aggregate feasibility constraints in the market. Namely, when obtaining their optimal
demands and supplies it is assumed that agents can not demand or supply more than
the available amounts present in the market.
The most important results of this paper are the following.
First, we show that each one of the sets of payo¤s corresponding to the three
group stability notions can be directly identied with the union of Cores of particular
cooperative games with transferable utility, where the blocking power of coalitions
is inherited from the corresponding nature of the sale contracts between buyers and
sellers (unit-by-unit, good-by-good, or global). Therefore, the stability notion asso-
ciated to the Core is closely related to the group stability notions, provided that the
games for which we obtain the Core are properly dened.
Second, and using this identication, we show that the following properties con-
nected with the structure of the set of payo¤s corresponding to the alternative group
stability notions hold. (a) The three notions of group stability are supported by a
Cartesian product structure between a given set of matrices of prices (that can be
interpreted as a set of discriminated buyer-seller prices) and the set of optimal as-
signments. (b) All payo¤ vectors in any of the sets corresponding to the three group
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stability notions are fully identied by a set of matrices of prices (dened accordingly
to the nature of sale contracts). Each price in the matrix indicates how the gains
from trade of each unit of each good are distributed between the buyer and the seller.
(c) All payo¤ vectors in any of the sets corresponding to the three group stability
notions are completely identied with the solutions of a system of bounded linear
inequalities.
Third, using a similar technique to that already used for the group stability no-
tions we show that each of the two competitive equilibrium notions can be directly
identied with the union of Cores of certain cooperative games with transferable util-
ity. This result allows us to obtain for the two competitive equilibrium concepts the
same conclusions that we have already obtained for the three group stability notions.
Hence, cooperative as well as competitive solutions have all the same properties from
a structural and computational point of view. Furthermore, all studied solutions
maintain a strictly nested relationship.
In short, the paper contributes to the study of markets with indivisible goods. In
particular, it shows that the two competitive equilibrium notions are immune with
respect to the secession of subgroups of agents. It also identies some structural
properties that hold for competitive equilibrium solutions as well as for di¤erent
notions of group stability.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model
introduced in Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012). In Section 3 we dene three notions
of group stability and study the equivalence of each of these notions with the Cores
of their corresponding cooperative games with transferable utility. We show that the
three group stability sets of payo¤s have a Cartesian product structure and that they
can be identied as the solutions of a system of linear inequalities. In Section 4 we
perform a similar analysis for the two notions of competitive equilibria. In Section 5
we compare the three notions of group stability with the two notions of competitive
equilibria. Section 6 contains an Appendix with the proofs of three results omitted
in the main text.
2 Preliminaries
A generalized assignment game (a market) consists of three nite and disjoint sets:
the set B of B buyers, the set G of G goods, and the set S of S sellers. We denote
a generic buyer by i, a generic good by j, and a generic seller by k. Buyers have a
constant marginal valuation of each good. Let vij  0 be the monetary valuation that
buyer i assigns to each unit of good j; namely, vij is the maximum price that buyer
i is willing to pay for each unit of good j: Denote by V = (vij)(i;j)2BG the matrix
of valuations. We assume that buyer i 2 B can buy at most di 2 Z+nf0g units in
total, where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers. The strictly positive integer di
should be interpreted as a capacity constraint due to limits on is ability for storage,
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transport, etc. Denote by d = (di)i2B the vector of maximal demands. Each seller
k 2 S has qjk 2 Z+ indivisible units of each good j 2 G. Denote by Q = (qjk)(j;k)2GS
the matrix of capacities. We assume that there is a strictly amount of each good;
namely,
for each j 2 G there exists k 2 S such that qjk > 0: (1)
Let rjk  0 be the monetary valuation that seller k assigns to each unit of good j;
that is, rjk is the reservation (or minimum) price that seller k is willing to accept for
each unit of good j. Denote by R = (rjk)(j;k)2GS the matrix of reservation prices.
A market M is a 7-tuple (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) satisfying condition (1). Shapley and
Shubik (1972)s (one-to-one) assignment game is a special case of a market where
each buyer can buy at most one unit, there is only one unit of each good, and each
seller only owns one unit of one of the goods; i.e., di = 1 for all i 2 B, G = S, and
for all (j; k) 2 G  S, qjk = 1 if j = k and qjk = 0 if j 6= k.
LetM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market. An assignment for marketM is a three-
dimensional integer matrix (i.e., a 3rd-order tensor) A = (Aijk)(i;j;k)2BGS 2 ZBGS+
describing a collection of deliveries of units of the goods from sellers to buyers. Each
Aijk should be interpreted as buyer i receives Aijk units of good j from seller k.
We often omit the sets to which the subscripts belong to and write, for instance,P
ijk Aijk and
P
iAijk instead of
P
(i;j;k)2BGS Aijk and
P
i2B Aijk, respectively.
The assignment A is feasible for market M if each buyer i buys at most di units
and each seller k sells at most qjk units of each good j. We are only interested in
feasible assignments; namely in the set
fA 2 ZBGS+ j
P
jk Aijk  di for all i 2 B and
P
iAijk  qjk for all (j; k) 2 G  Sg:
For further reference, we denote this set of feasible assignments for market M by
F0(M) (or simply by F0).
The total gain from trade of market M at assignment A is
TM (A) =
P
ijk(vij   rjk)  Aijk:
Denition 1 A feasible assignment A is optimal for market M if, for any feasible
assignment A0, TM(A)  TM (A0) :
Example 1 below contains an instance of a market with a unique optimal assign-
ment.
Example 1 Let (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market where B = fb1 ; b2g ; G = fg1 ; g2; g3g ;
S = fs1g ; V =

6 4 4
7 3 5

; d = (10; 10), Q = (10; 5; 1) and R = (5; 2; 1): For any
A0 2 F0,
TM (A0) = (6  5)  A0111 + (4  2)  A0121 + (4  1)  A0131 + (7  5)  A0211
+(3  2)  A0221 + (5  1)  A0231
= A0111 + 2  A0121 + 3  A0131 + 2  A0211 + A0221 + 4  A0231:
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It is easy to check that A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

is the unique optimal assignment for M
and TM (A) = 1 + 2  5 + 2  9 + 4 = 33. 
Let F(M) (or simply F) be the set of all optimal assignments for marketM . The
set F is always non-empty.5 Denote by TM the total gain from trade of market M at
any optimal assignment.
Fix a market M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q). Denote by G> the set of goods that are
exchanged at some optimal assignment. Namely,
G> = fj 2 G j there exists A 2 F such that Aijk > 0 for some (i; k) 2 B  Sg:
Moreover, for each buyer i 2 B and each seller k 2 S, dene
G>ik = fj 2 G j there exists A 2 F such that Aijk > 0g
as the set of goods that i buys to k at some optimal assignment.
3 Cooperative Solutions: Core and Group Stabil-
ity
Massó and Neme (2013) dene, for any marketM , two cooperative solutions: the Core
and a group stable set (they call it set-wise stable). As described in the Introduction
the two concepts are based on the idea that a coalition will object to a proposed payo¤
vector if all agents in the coalition can improve upon their payo¤s, but di¤er in that,
when objecting, the Core requires that all members of the blocking coalition break
their exchanges with agents outside the coalition while group stability (which we
shall call it here type 1 group stability) allows that the exchanges of an agent in the
blocking coalition with agents outside the coalition are maintained or reduced (since
sale contracts are unit-by-unit). Here we propose two alternative notions of group
stability. Type 2 group stability makes sense when sale contracts are performed
good-by-good and therefore an agent in the blocking coalition can maintain with an
agent outside the coalition the exchange of all units of the good or else delete them all.
Type 3 group stability makes sense when between a buyer and a seller there exists
only a sale contract and therefore an agent in the blocking coalition can maintain
with an agent outside the coalition all exchanges or delete them all.
Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S be a coalition. Denote
the sets of buyers and sellers in C by BC = C \ B and SC = C \ S, respectively.
5See Milgrom (2009) for a proof of this statement, based on a x point argument, in a more
general model. Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) contains a proof of the statement, using only linear
programming arguments, in the same model as the one studied here.
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Denition 2 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S be a
coalition. A feasible assignment bA 2 F0 is 1 group compatible with C if there exists
an optimal assignment A 2 F such that
(i) for all i 2 BC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either k 2 SC or else bAijk  Aijk; and
(ii) for all k 2 SC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either i 2 BC or else bAijk  Aijk:6
We want to emphasize that the above denition considers as compatible any re-
allocation of goods between the agents within the coalition and only decreases (with
respect of some optimal assignment) the trade, of any good, between an agent in the
coalition with another agent outside. The next two denitions of group compatibil-
ity limits the reallocations of goods between members of the blocking coalition and
outsiders depending on whether sale contracts are good-by-good or global.
Denition 3 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S be a
coalition. A feasible assignment bA 2 F0 is 2 group compatible with C if there exists
an optimal assignmentA 2 F such that
(i) for all i 2 BC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either k 2 SC or else bAijk = Aijk, and
(ii) for all k 2 SC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either i 2 BC or else bAijk = Aijk:
Denition 4 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S be a
coalition. A feasible assignment bA 2 F0 is 3 group compatible with C if there exists
an optimal assignment A 2 F such that
(i) for all i 2 BC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either k 2 SC or else bAij0k = Aij0k for all
j0 2 G, and
(ii) for all k 2 SC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either i 2 BC or else bAij0k = Aij0k for all
j0 2 G.
Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market, C  B[S a coalition and t 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Denote by F t(C) the set of all feasible assignments that are t group compatible with
C.
Example 1 (continued) To see the di¤erences among the three types of group
compatibility, consider the coalition C = fb1 ; s1g in market M of Example 1. Then,
F1(C) = f bA 2 F0 j 0  bA211  9, bA221 = 0 and 0  bA231  1g:
F2(C) = f bA 2 F0 j bA211 2 f0; 9g, bA221 = 0 and bA231 2 f0; 1gg:
F3(C) = f bA 2 F0 j ( bA211; bA221; bA231) = (9; 0; 1) or ( bA211; bA221; bA231) = (0; 0; 0)g:
Thus, F3(C)  F2(C)  F1(C) and
6Massó and Neme (2013) add a third condition requiring that for all i =2 BC and k =2 SC ; bAijk = 0
for all j 2 G. Since the exchanges between two agents outside the blocking coalition are irrelevant
for describing the payo¤s that agents in the blocking coalition can obtain, here we will dispense with
this condition, since often will be useful that the assignment bA be an optimal one.
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
5 5 0
5 0 1

2 F1(C)nF2(C),

1 5 1
9 0 0

2 F2(C)nF3(C), and

4 5 1
0 0 0

2
F3(C): 
LetM = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market. A 3rd-order tensor   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS 2
RBGS+ is a distribution matrix for market M if for all (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S such
that vij  rjk and j 2 G>ik, vij   ijk  rjk holds. Let   be a distribution matrix
for market M and assume that vij  rjk for some (i; j; k) 2 B  G  S and j 2 G>ik.
Then,  ijk describes a possible way of how buyer i and seller k can split the gain
vij   rjk  0 they could obtain by exchanging one unit of good j: buyer i receives
vij    ijk and seller k receives  ijk   rjk. If j =2 G>ik the value  ijk will be irrelevant
since i and k will not exchange any unit of good j in any optimal assignment. Observe
that distribution matrices are not necessarily anonymous because a buyer may obtain
di¤erent gains per unit of good j if he buys the same good from di¤erent sellers, and
viceversa. Denote by D(M) (or simply by D) the set of all distribution matrices for
market M:
Denition 5 A vector (ui; wk)(i;k)2BS 2 RBS is a feasible payo¤ for market M ifP
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk = T
M :
Denote by X (M) (or simply by X ) the set of all feasible payo¤s for market M:
Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S a coalition. For every
  2 D and bA 2 F0, dene the gain for C at bA according to   by the expression7
M(C; bA; )  P
(i;j;k) 2BCGSC
(vij   rjk)  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
(2)
Observe that M(C; bA; ) is independent of t 2 f1; 2; 3g:
We are now ready to dene the blocking notions according to the assignments
that the coalition can use.
Denition 6 Let M be a market and t 2 f1; 2; 3g: A payo¤ (u;w) 2 X (M) is not
t group blocked if there exists a distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS 2 D(M)
such that for all coalition C  B [ S and bA 2 F t(C),P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; ):
It is useful to point out that the denition depends on t 2 f1; 2; 3g since the gain
for C depends on the set F t(C) of feasible assignments (that is, t group compatible)
with C: Finally, we dene the three notions of group stability.
7Given a set Y we denote its complement by Y c: The reader should not be confused when Y is
BC or SC ; whose complements are denoted by  BCc and  SCc ; respectively.
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Denition 7 Let M be a market and t 2 f1; 2; 3g: A payo¤ (u;w) 2 X (M) is
t group stable for M if it is not t group blocked.8
Denote by GSt(M) (or simply GSt) the set of payo¤s that are t group stable for
M: Since F3(C) F2(C) F1(C) for all C  B [ S, it follows that
GS1  GS2  GS3.
Moreover, there are markets for which these inclusions are strict and hence,9
GS1 $ GS2 $ GS3. (3)
By the above remark and the fact that GS1 6= ; (see Massó and Neme (2013)) all
t group stable sets are non-empty. For further reference, we present this result as
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 For any market M and t 2 f1; 2; 3g; GSt(M) 6= ;:
Massó and Neme (2013) dene the Core of marketM as the Core of the cooperative
game with transferable utility induced by M . They show rst that the 1 group
stable set is a strict subset of the Core and strictly contains the set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s. Second, the 1 group stable set converges in the second replica
to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s while the Core does not converge to it
in a nite number of replica. Hence, one may infer from the two results that the two
cooperative notions are essentially di¤erent. We will see here that the di¤erence does
not refer so much to the solution concept but rather on how the game for which the
Core is obtained is dened. Massó and Neme (2013) dene the cooperative game by
assuming that the assignment bA is feasible for a coalition C  B [ S if and only if
members of C only exchange goods among themselves.
Denition 8 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and C  B [ S be a
coalition. A feasible assignment bA 2 F0 is Core-compatible with C if
(i) for all i 2 BC ; bAijk > 0 implies k 2 SC , and
(ii) for all k 2 SC ; bAijk > 0 implies i 2 BC :
GivenC  B[S, the set of all Core-compatible assignments withC will be denoted
byFCo(C). Using this notion, we dene the cooperative game with transferable utility
(B [ S; v) where, for every C  B [ S,10
v(C) = maxbA2FCo(C)
M(C; bA; ): (4)
8The notion of 1 group stability corresponds to set-wise stability dened in Massó and Neme
(2013).
9In the Appendix in Section 6 we show that this property holds for the market M of Example 1.
10Observe that if bA 2 FCo(C), then M (C; bA; ) is independent of   since M (C; bA; ) =P
(i;j;k) 2BCGSC
(vij   rjk)  bAijk: For those cases we could simply write M (C; bA):
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Then, the Core of market M; denoted by C(M), is the Core of the game (B [ S; v);
namely,
C(M) = f(u;w) 2 X (M) j v(C)  P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk for all C  B [ Sg:
Now, if we accept the notions of group stability as reasonable solutions, we can
dene new cooperative games with transferable utility where compatible assignments
with a coalition C admit that its members may have certain exchanges with agents
outside C. For this purpose it is necessary to consider a distribution matrix   2 D
indicating how the gains from trade are distributed with members outside coalition
C. We now present these notions formally.
Denition 9 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market,   2 D and t 2 f1; 2; 3g:
The cooperative game with transferable utility associated to t and  ; denoted by (B[
S; vt ), is dened as follows: for every C  B [ S,
vt (C) = maxbA2Ft(C)
M(C; bA; ):
If   2 D is given and we allow C to choose among the set of assignments in F t(C),
the game (B [ S; vt ) can be interpreted in a similar way as we interpreted the game
dened in (4), where each coalition maximizes the total payo¤ since M(C; bA; ) is
the total gain received by members of C under bA: We will denote by Ct (M) (or
simply by Ct ) the Core of the game (B [ S; vt ).
Remark 1 Note that for all   2 D and t 2 f1; 2; 3g;
TM = v(B [ S) = v1 (B [ S) = v2 (B [ S) = v3 (B [ S):
Hence, (u;w) is a feasible payo¤ (i.e., (u;w) 2 X ) if and only ifPi2B ui+Pk2S wk =
vt (B [ S):
Using the games (B [ S; vt ) associated to M we can now see that the notions of
Core and group stability are extremely related. Indeed, the following result holds.
Theorem 1 Let M be a market. Then, for all t 2 f1; 2; 3g,
GSt(M)=
[
 2D(M)
Ct (M):
Proof Fix M and t: We rst show that for all   2 D, Ct GSt: Let (u;w) 2 Ct .
By Remark 1, (u;w) is a feasible payo¤. Moreover, for all C  B [ S, Pi2BC ui +P
k2SC wk  vt (C): Hence, for all C and all bA 2 F t(C), Pi2BC ui +Pk2SC wk 
M(C; bA; ): Thus, (u;w) 2 GSt. Namely, S
 2D(M)
Ct   GSt:
Take now a payo¤ (u;w) 2 GSt. Since (u;w) is a feasible payo¤, by Remark 1,P
i2B ui +
P
k2S wk = v
t (B [ S) for all   2 D: Moreover, and since (u;w) is not
GSt blocked, there exists   2 D such that for all C  B [ S and all bA 2 F t(C);P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; ):
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Hence, there exists   2 D such thatPi2BC ui+Pk2SC wk  vt (C) for all C  B[S;
namely, (u;w) 2 Ct : Thus, (u;w) 2 S
 2D(M)
Ct : 
In the Appendix in Section 6 we show, using the market of Example 1, that the
sets Ct  may be empty for some  .
3.1 Cartesian Product Structure and Computation of the
Group Stable Solutions
In this section we present, using Theorem 1, results on the structure of the t group
stable set of payo¤s for t = 1; 2; 3 and how to compute them.
Fix   2 D and A 2 F0: Dene the utility of buyer i 2 B at the pair ( ; A) as the
total net gain obtained by i from his exchanges specied by A and the distribution
of gains given by  . Denote such utility by ui( ; A); namely,
ui( ; A) =
P
jk
(vij    ijk)  Aijk: (5)
Similarly, dene the utility of seller k 2 S at the pair ( ; A) as the total net gain
obtained by k from his exchanges specied by A and the distribution of gains given
by  . Denote such utility by wk( ; A); namely,
wk( ; A) =
P
ij
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk: (6)
Given ( ; A), we will denote by u( ; A) = (u( ; A))i2B and w( ; A) = (wk( ; A))k2S
the vectors of utilities of buyers and sellers at ( ; A), respectively.
Proposition 2 Let M be a market,   a distribution matrix and t 2 f1; 2; 3g. Then,
Ct  6= ; if and only if Ct  = f(u( ; A); w( ; A)) j A 2 Fg:
Proof It is immediate to check that Ct  = f(u( ; A); w( ; A)) j A 2 Fg implies
Ct  6= ;. To show that the other implication holds, assume Ct  6= ;. We rst
check that (u( ; A); w( ; A)) 2 Ct  for all A 2 F . Let A 2 F be arbitrary and let
(u;w) 2 Ct . Consider any coalition C = fig with i 2 B: Then, A 2 F t(fig): Hence,
since (u;w) 2 Ct  and the denition of vt ;
ui  M(C;A; ) =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  Aijk: (7)
Similarly, and considering any coalition C = fkg with k 2 S,
wk  M(C;A; ) =
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk: (8)
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Moreover, by Remark 1,
P
i2B
ui+
P
k2S
wk = v
t (B[S) = TM : But TM = P
i2B
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)
Aijk +
P
k2S
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk: Hence, (7) and (8) imply
ui =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  Aijk for all i 2 B and
wk =
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  Aijk for all k 2 S:
Thus, (u;w) = (u( ; A); w( ; A)): Therefore, (u( ; A); w( ; A)) 2 Ct : Now it re-
mains to be proven that if (u;w) 2 Ct ; then there exists A 2 F such that (u;w) =
(u( ; A); w( ; A)); but observing that F = F t(B[S), it is proven similarly as we did
previously. 
Denote by Dt(M) = f  : Ct (M) 6= ;g (or simply by Dt) the set of distribu-
tion matrices whose associated game vt  has a non-empty Core. By Theorem 1 and
Proposition 2, the set GSt has the following Cartesian product structure.
Corollary 1 Let M be a market and t 2 f1; 2; 3g: Then,
GSt = f(u( ; A); w( ; A)) j ( ; A) 2 Dt Fg:
We will refer to the setDt as the set of t distributions by groups: The above Corol-
lary establishes that GSt has a similar structure to the set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s.11
Lemma 1 Let t 2 f1; 2; 3g and   2 Dt be such that Ct  6= ;: Then, (u( ; A); w( ; A)) =
(u( ; A0); w( ; A0)) for all A;A0 2 F .
Proof Observe that the proof of Proposition 2 does not depend on the particular
optimal assignment A 2 F . Hence, xed  ; if Ct  6= ; then the vector of utilities
(u( ; A); w( ; A)) at the pair ( ; A) is independent of the chosen optimal assignment
A 2 F . 
By Lemma 1, for   2 Dt and A 2 F we can write (u( ); w( )) instead of
(u( ; A); w( ; A)). Hence, the following result follows immediately from Theorem
1 and Lemma 1.
Corollary 2 Let M be a market and t 2 f1; 2; 3g: Then,
GSt = f(u( ); w( )) j   2 Dtg:
The above corollary establishes that each payo¤ vector in GSt comes from a dis-
tribution matrix   2 Dt: Again, Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) show that a similar
11Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) show that the set of competitve equilibrium payo¤s is the
Cartesian product of the set of competitive equilibrium prices and the set of optimal assignments
F .
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result holds for the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the gains from trade
are determined by an equilibrium price vector (a price for each good).
Proposition 3 below gives necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which a dis-
tribution matrix   is a t distribution by groups. But to state it, we present, given
an optimal assignment A 2 F , the following system of inequalities on  :
M(C; A^; )  M(C;A; ) for all C  B [ S and all A^ 2 F t(C): (9)
Proposition 3 Let M be a market and t 2 f1; 2; 3g: Then, the following statements
are equivalent:
(i)   is a t distribution by groups.
(ii)
vt (B [ S) =
X
i2B
vt (fig) +
X
k2S
vt (fkg) and (10)
vt (C) 
X
i2BC
vt (fig) +
X
k2SC
vt (fkg) for all C  B [ S: (11)
(iii) There exists A 2 F such that vt (C) = M(C;A; ) for all C  B [ C.
(iv) For all A 2 F , vt (C) = M(C;A; ) for all C  B [ C.
(v)   solves the system in (9).
Proof The equivalence between (iii) and (v) is immediate. That (ii) implies (i) is
immediate since, by (10) and (11), (vt (fig); vt (fkg)(i;k)2B[S 2 Ct : By the denition
of vt ; we have that (iii) implies (ii). That (iv) implies (iii) is also immediate. It
remains to be proven that (i) implies (iv).
Assume Ct  6= ; and let A 2 F . By Proposition 2, (u( ; A); w( ; A)) 2 Ct :
Hence,
ui( ; A)  vt (fig) for all i 2 B and
wk( ; A)  vt (fkg) for all k 2 S:
Thus, by the denition of vt ,
ui( ; A) = v
t (fig) for all i 2 B and
wk( ; A) = v
t (fkg) for all k 2 S:
Hence,
vt (fig) = M(fig; A; ) for all i 2 B and
vt (fkg) = M(fkg; A; ) for all k 2 S:
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Now, since (u( ; A); w( ; A)) 2 Ct  holds, by the denition of vt (C) it follows that
vt (B [ S) =
X
i2B
ui( ; A) +
X
k2S
wk( ; A) and, for all C  B [ S,
M(C;A; )  vt (C) 
X
i2BC
ui( ; A) +
X
k2SC
wk( ; A) = 
M(C;A; ).
Thus, vt (C) = M(C;A; ) for all C  B [ S: 
4 Competitive Solutions
4.1 Two Competitive Equilibrium Notions
In this section we rst present two already known competitive solutions for generalized
assignment games. Using a similar approach to the one already used with t group
stability we will see how competitive equilibria are related with the notions of Core,
provided that the cooperative games with transferable utility are dened properly.
This will allow us to draw conclusions with regard to the structure of competitive
solutions and how to compute them.
The rst competitive solution was presented by Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012).
We will see how we can obtain some of the their results using the approach used in
the previous section. This solution assumes that buyers and sellers exchange goods
through competitive markets. Namely, there is a unique market for each of the goods
(with its corresponding price). Hence, a price vector is an n dimensional vector of
non-negative real numbers. Buyers and sellers are price-takers in the following sense.
Given a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 Rn+ each seller o¤ers units of the goods he owns
(up to his capacity) to maximize his net gains and each buyer demands units of the
goods (up to his maximal capacity) to maximize his total net valuation. The unique
information that each agent has about the markets, besides the price vector, is his
per unit valuations of the goods and his capacity of maximal demand (if the agent
is a buyer) and his reservation prices and number units owned of each of the goods.
Agents do not know the aggregate capacities.
In the second notion we will assume that the aggregate capacities of the market
are known by the agents. For instance, because the market is small and the transac-
tions take place all at the same time in a small place. Hence, given a price vector p,
agents will maximize their utility taking into account the market aggregate capaci-
ties. Namely, a buyer i will never demand of good j a quantity larger than
P
k qjk,
eventhough this amount is smaller than di and the net valuation (vij   pj) of good j
is strictly larger than the net valuations of all the other goods. This notion can be
seen as an extension of the competitive equilibrium notions introduced and studied in
Sotomayor (2007), in an assignment model with indivisible goods and by Sotomayor
(2009 and 2011), in a model with innitely divisible goods, but in both cases and
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in contrast with our model, it is assumed that sellers only own units of the same
good. In these three papers, given a price vector p, agentsdemands and supplies are
obtained by solving their maximizing problems over the set of feasible assignments;
that is, it is assumed that agents know the aggregate capacities.
It is also possible to consider the case where only buyers know the aggregate
capacities and only they adjust their demands to such constraints, and viceversa.
Our proofs could be adapted easily to these two settings to obtain similar conclusions
for them.
To present the rst approach, we transcribe some denitions in Jaume, Massó and
Neme (2012).
Supply of seller k: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, seller k o¤ers of each
good j any feasible amount that maximizes his gain; namely,
Sjk(pj) =
8<:
fqjkg if pj > rjk
f0; 1; :::; qjkg if pj = rjk
f0g if pj < rjk:
(12)
To dene the demand of buyer i 2 B, we will use the following notation. Let p 2 RG+
and let
r>i (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g > 0g (13)
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximal (and strictly positive) net
valuation at p: Obviously, for some p; the set r>i (p) may be empty. Let
ri (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g  0g (14)
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximal (and strictly positive) net
valuation at p: Obviously, for some p; the set ri (p) may be empty. It is obvious that
for all p 2 RG+ and all i 2 B,
r>i (p)  ri (p): (15)
Demand of buyer i: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, buyer i demands any
feasible amount of goods that maximize his net valuation at p; namely,
Di(p) = f = (jk)(j;k)2GS 2 ZGS j (D.a) jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G  S,
(D.b)
P
jk jk  di;
(D.c) r>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
jk jk = di and
(D.d)
P
k jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p)g:
Given A 2 F0 and i 2 B, denote by A(i) = (A(i)jk)(j;k)2GS the element in ZGS+
such that, for all (j; k) 2 G  S, A(i)jk = Aijk:
Denition 10 A -1 competitive equilibrium12 of marketM is a pair (p;A) 2 RG+
F0 such that
12Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) refer to this notion as competitive equilibrium; here we will
refer to it as -1 competitive equilibrium to have available in this way a notation that will help us
to compare it with other solutions.
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(E.D) for all i 2 B; A(i) 2 Di (p), and
(E.S) for all j 2 G and all k 2 S; PiAijk 2 Sjk (pj) :
Next, we present the second competitive solution related to situations where
agents, given a price vector, adjust their demands and supplies to the aggregate
restrictions of the market. Given a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+ sellers will o¤er
units of the goods (below their capacities) to maximize the net gains at p; but know-
ing that buyers will be able buy at most D =
P
i2B di units in total, and buyers will
demand units of the goods (below their capacities) to maximize the net valuations
at p; but knowing that they will be able to buy at most Qj =
P
k2S qjk units of each
good j. To dene the supply of seller k 2 S, we will need the following notation. Let
p 2 RG+ be a price vector and let
r1>k (p) = fj 2 G j pj   rjk = maxj02Gfpj0   rj0kg > 0g
r2>k (p) = fj 2 Gnr1>k (p) j pj   rjk = maxj02Gnr1>k (p)fpj0   rj0kg > 0g
...
rz>k (p) = fj 2 Gn [z 1m=1 rm>k (p) j pj   rjk = maxj02Gn[z 1m=1rm>i (p)fpj0   rj0kg > 0g
...
rJ>k (p) = fj 2 Gn [J 1m=1 rm>k (p) j pj   rjk = maxj02Gn[J 1m=1rm>k (p)fpj0   rj0kg > 0g
be the sets of goods that give to seller k an strictly positive net gain at p, ordered in
such a way that goods in rz>k (p) give a larger net gain than goods in rz
0>
k (p) if and
only if z < z0: Obviously, for some p; the set rz>k (p) may be empty from a given z
on.
Since seller k knows the market constraints, k knows that the maximal possible
demand is D =
P
i2B di: Hence, k will adjust his supply to this demand. Now dene
s1k(p) = minf
P
j2r1>k (p) qjk; Dg
s2k(p) = minf
P
j2r2>k (p) qjk; D   s1k(p)g
...
szk(p) = minf
P
j2rz>k (p) qjk; D  
Pz 1
m=1 smk(p)g
...
sJk(p) = minf
P
j2rJ>k (p) qjk; D  
PJ 1
m=1 smk(p)g:
We may have szk(p) = 0 from some z on.
Now, let
rk (p) = fj 2 G j pj   rjk  0g (16)
be the set of goods that give to seller k a non-negative net gain at p: Obviously, for
some p; the set rk (p) may be empty. It is obvious that for all p 2 RG+ and all k 2 S,
rz>k (p)  rk (p) for all z = 1; :::; J: (17)
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Supply-0 of seller k: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, seller k supplies any
feasible amount for the market of the goods that maximize his net gain at p; namely
S0k(p) = f = (j)j2G 2 ZG j (S.a0) j  0 for all j 2 G,
(S.b0) j  qjk for all j 2 G,
(S.c0) rz>k (p) 6= ; =)
P
j2rz>k (p) j = szk(p)
for z = 1; :::; J and
(S.d0) j > 0 =) j 2 rk (p)g:
Therefore, S0k(p) describes the set of sales that maximize the net gain of seller
k at p (taking into account the market constraints).13 Observe that the set of sales
described by each element in S0k(p) gives, to seller k; the same net gain; namely, k is
indi¤erent among all sales in S0k(p).
To dene the demand of buyer i 2 B, we will need the following notation. Let
p 2 RG+ be a price vector and let
r1>i (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = maxj02Gfvij0   pj0g > 0g
r2>i (p) = fj 2 Gnr1>i (p) j vij   pj = maxj02Gnr1>i (p)fvij0   pj0g > 0g
...
rz>i (p) = fj 2 Gn [z 1m=1 rm>i (p) j vij   pj = maxj02Gn[z 1m=1rm>i (p)fvij0   pj0g > 0g
...
rJ>i (p) = fj 2 Gn [J 1m=1 rm>i (p) j vij   pj = maxj02Gn[J 1m=1rm>i (p)fvij0   pj0g > 0g
be the sets of goods that give to buyer i an strictly positive net valuation at p; ordered
in such a way that goods in rz>i give a larger net valuation than goods in rz
0>
i if and
only if z < z0: Obviously, for some p; the set rz>i (p) may be empty from some z on.
Now we dene
d1i(p) = minfdi;
P
j2r1>i (p)Qjg
d2i(p) = minfdi   d1i(p);
P
j2r2>i (p)Qjg
...
dzi(p) = minfdi  
Pz 1
m=1 dmi(p);
P
j2rz>i (p)Qjg
...
dJi(p) = minfdi  
PJ 1
m=1 dmi(p);
P
j2rJ>i (p)Qjg:
Obviously, for some p; we may have dzi(p) = 0 from some z on. Also, for all p 2 RG+
and all i 2 B,
rz>i (p)  ri (p) for all z = 1; :::; J: (18)
Demand-0 of buyer i: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, buyer i demands
any feasible amount for the market that maximizes his net valuation at p; namely,
13When szk(p) =
P
j2rz>k (p) qjk for all z = 1; :::; J , the supply 0 of seller k coincides with that
presented in Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012).
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D0i (p) = f = (jk)(j;k)2GS 2 ZGS j (D.a0) jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G  S,
(D.b0)
P
jk jk  di;
(D.c0) rz>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
j2rz>i (p)
P
k jk = dzi(p)
for z = 1; :::; J and
(D.d0)
P
k jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p)g:
Thus, D0i (p) describes the set of all purchases that maximize the net valuation of
buyer i at p, taking into account the aggregate constraints of the market.14 Observe
that the set of purchases described by each element in D0i (p) give to i the same net
valuation; namely, i is indi¤erent among all purchases in D0i (p):
Denition 11 A 0 competitive equilibrium of marketM is a pair (p;A) 2 RG+F0
such that
(E.D0) for all i 2 B; A(i) 2 D0i (p), and
(E.S0) for all k 2 S; (PiAijk)j2G 2 S0k (p) :
In the remaining of this section, t will be an index in f 1; 0g: We say that the
vector p 2 RG+ is a t competitive equilibrium price (or simply a t equilibrium price)
of marketM if there exists A 2 F0 such that (p;A) is a t competitive equilibrium of
M (or simply a t equilibrium). Denote by P t to the set of all t equilibrium prices
of market M:
Fix a price vector p 2 RG+ and a feasible assignment A 2 F0: According to (5) and
(6), the utility of buyer i 2 B at (p;A) is
ui(p;A) =
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk
and the utility of seller k 2 S at (p;A) is
wk(p;A) =
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk:
Denition 12 Let M be a market and t 2 f 1; 0g: The set of t competitive
equilibrium payo¤s is given by
CE t = f(u;w) 2 RBRS j (u;w) = (u(p;A); w(p;A)) for some t equilibrium (p;A)g:
We now dene a cooperative game with transferable utility that will allow us to
draw conclusions about P t and CE t, for t =  1; 0; similarly as we did for Dt and GSt;
for t = 1; 2; 3:
Denition 13 Let M be a market. A pair (AB; AS) 2 ZBGS+  ZBGS+ is
-1 compatible in M if
(i) for each i 2 B; Pjk ABijk  di; and
(ii) for each k 2 S and j 2 G; Pi ASijk  qjk.
14When d1i(p) = di the demand-0 coincides with the denition in Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012).
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The set of pairs -1 compatible inM will be denoted by F 1: Moreover, and with
an abuse of notation, we will denote by F0 = f(A;A) j (A;A) 2 F 1g the set of
0 compatible assignments in M:15
Denition 14 Let M be a market, t 2 f 1; 0g, p 2 RG+ a price vector, C  B [ S
a coalition and (AB; AS) 2 F t: Dene the net gain for C at (AB; AS) according to p
by
'M(C; (AB; AS); p) =
P
i2BC
P
jk
(vij   pj)  ABijk +
P
k2SC
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  ASijk:
Note that if (A;A) 2 F0 then 'M(C; (A;A); p) = M(C;A; p), where M is given
by (2) after setting, for all j 2 G,  ijk = pj for all (i; k) 2 B  S. For each price
vector p; we can dene the following associated games to market M:
Denition 15 LetM be a market, t = f 1; 0g and p a price vector. The cooperative
game (B [ S; vtp) with transferable utility associated to t and p is dened as follows:
vtp(C) =

max(AB ;AS)2Ft'M(C; (AB; AS); p) if C  B [ S
TM if C = B [ S:
We denote by Ctp(M) (or simply by Ctp) the Core of the game (B [ S; vtp): We
now see that these Cores are intimately related with the corresponding notions of
competitive equilibria.
Theorem 2 Let M be a market and t = f 1; 0g. Then,
p 2 P t if and only if Ctp 6= ;:
To prove Theorem 2 we need the following two results.
Lemma 2 Let M be a market and t = f 1; 0g: Then, (p;A) is a t equilibrium if
and only if, for all (AB; AS) 2 F t;P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk 
P
jk
(vij   pj)  ABijk for all i 2 B (19)
and P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk 
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  ASijk for all k 2 S: (20)
Proof See the Appendix in Section 6. 
Parallel to Proposition 2 , we now have Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Let M be a market, t = f 1; 0g and p 2 RG+ a price vector. Then,
Ctp 6= ; if and only if Ctp = f(u(p;A); w(p;A)) j A 2 Fg:
15Although, by the notation used in the previous section, we have that F0 = fA j (A;A) 2 F 1g
the abuse of notation when writing F0 = f(A;A) j (A;A) 2 F 1g does not produce any trouble and
helps to present the results.
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Proof It is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 and therefore it is omitted. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume p 2 P t and letA be such that (p;A) is a t equilibrium.
Then, by the denition of vtp and Lemma 2, (u(p;A); w(p;A)) 2 Ctp: To see that the
other implication holds, let p be such that Ctp 6= ; and let A 2 F . By Proposition 4,
(u(p;A); w(p;A)) 2 Ctp: Hence, for all (AB; AS) 2 F t,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk 
P
jk
(vij   pj)  ABijk for all i 2 B andP
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk 
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  ASijk for all k 2 S.
Thus, by Lemma 2, (p;A) is a t equilibrium and hence, p 2 P t. 
It is easy to check that, for all p 2 RG+;
v 1p(C)  v0p(C) for all C ( B [ S and (21)
v 1p(B [ S) = v0p(B [ S) (22)
hold. Hence, C 1p  C0p for all p 2 RG+: Thus, by Theorem 2, the following result
holds.
Corollary 3 Let M be a market. Then, ; 6= P 1  P0:
Proof Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) show that ; 6= P -1. The inclusion follows
from Theorem 2, (21) and (22). The strict inclusion follows from Example 2 below.
Example 2 Let M = (B;G;S; V; d; R;Q) be a market where B = f1; 2g; G =
f1; 2g; S = f1g; V =

6 4
7 0

; d = (7; 5) Q = (8; 4) and R = (5; 2): The unique
optimal assignment is A =

3 4
5 0

. Consider the price vector p = (5; 2): Then,
v0p(fb1; b2; s1g) = T (A) = 1  3 + 2  4 + 2  5 = 21; v0p(fb1; s1g) = 1  3 + 2  4 = 11;
v0p(fb2; s1g) = 2  5 = 10; v0p(fs1g) = 0; v0p(fb1g) = 1  3 + 2  4 = 11; v0p(fb2g) =
2  5 = 10: Thus, (u(p;A); w(p;A)) = (11; 10; 0) 2 C0p and hence, (5; 2) 2 P0: But
(5; 2) =2 P 1; since at p = (5; 2) buyer b1 would demand 7 units of good 2: 
The next proposition follows immediately from Lemma 2 and the fact that ifbA 2 F0; then ( bA; bA) 2 F t for all t 2 f 1; 0g.
Proposition 5 Let M be a market and t 2 f 1; 0g: Then, (p;A) is a t equilibrium
if and only if p 2 P t and A 2 F .16
A result, similar to Theorem 1 for group stable sets, hold for the sets of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s.
16Jaume, Masso y Neme (2012) prove the result in another way when t =  1.
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Theorem 3 Let M be a market : Then, for t 2 f 1; 0g;17
;CE t=
[
p2RG+
Ctp:
Proof That CE t  S
p2RG+
Ctp holds follows from Theorem 2 and Propositions 4 and
5. To see that the other inclusion holds, let (u;w) 2 S
p2RG+
Ctp: By Proposition 4, there
exists (p;A) 2 RG+F such that (u;w) = (u(p;A); w(p;A)) 2 Ctp. Hence, by Lemma
2 and Theorem 2, (u;w) 2 CE t. 
Corollary 4 Let M be a market. Then, ; 6= CE 1  CE0:
Proof Jaume, Massó and Neme (2012) show that ; 6= CE 1. The inclusion follows
from Theorem 3, (21) and (22). Example 2 below shows that the inclusion may be
strict. 
Example 2 (continued) We already saw that p = (5; 2) 2 P0nP 1: Hence,
(11; 10; 0) 2 C0p and (11; 10; 0) 2 CE0: Moreover, we have that (u(p; A); w(p; A)) =
(11; 10; 0) if and only if p = (5; 2): But since (5; 2) =2 P 1, (11; 10; 0) =2 CE 1. Namely,
CE 1  CE0:
4.2 Cartesian Product Structure and Computation of Com-
petitive Equilibria
We have already seen that for t 2 f 1; 0g the set CE t is a Cartesian product in the
following sense:
CE t = f(u;w) 2 RBS j for some (p;A) 2 P t F , (u;w) = (u(p;A); w(p;A))g:
Now, parallel to Lemma 1, the following result holds.
Lemma 3 Let M be a market, t 2 f 1; 0g and p 2 RG+ a price vector. If Ctp 6= ;,
then (u(p;A); w(p;A)) = (u(p;A0); w(p;A0)) for all pairs A;A0 2 F .
Proof The proof proceeds similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, using the fact
that if A 2 F , then (A;A) 2 F t for t 2 f 1; 0g: 
Thus, if Ctp 6= ; and A 2 F we will write (u(p;A); w(p;A)) simply by (u(p); w(p)),
without any reference to A: We present this fact in the following Corollary.
17For the case t =  1; if we extend Denition 14 to all   2 D, we can show that
CE 1=
[
 2D
C 1 
holds. Indeed, if C 1  6= ; then   is essentially a price vector; namely, for every pair
(i; j; k); (i0; j; k0) 2 B  G  S such that j 2 G>ik \ G>i0k0 ,  ijk =  i0jk0 :
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Corollary 4 Let M be a market and t 2 f 1; 0g: Then, CE t = f(u(p); w(p)) j p 2
P tg:
Parallel to Proposition 2, we present several necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
Ctp 6= ; (one of them can be used to check whether or not p belongs to P t). Observe
that the condition
vtp(C) 
X
i2BC
vtp(fig) +
X
k2SC
vtp(fkg) for all C  B [ S
is trivially satised for t 2 f 1; 0g:
Fix A 2 F and consider the system on p of lineal inequalities given by
'M(C; (AB; AS); p)  'M(C; (A;A); p) for all C  B [ C with #C = 1
and for all (AB; AA) 2 F t: (23)
Proposition 6 Let M be a market, t 2 f 1; 0g and p 2 RG+ a price vector. Then,
the following statements are equivalent.
(i) p is a t equilibrium price.
(ii) Ctp 6= ;.
(iii)
vtp(B [ S) =
X
i2B
vtp(fig) +
X
k2S
vtp(fkg): (24)
(iv) There exists A 2 F such that vtp(C) = 'M(C; (A;A); p); for all C  B [ S with
#C = 1:
(v) For all A 2 F , vtp(C) = 'M(C; (A;A); p) for all C  B [ S with #C = 1:
(vi) p solves system (23).
Proof The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Theorem 2. The equiva-
lence between (iv) and (vi) is immediate. That (iii) implies (ii) follows from the fact
that (vtp(fig); vtp(fkg)(i;k)2B[S 2 Ct : That (iv) implies (iii) follows easily from the
denition vtp: That (v) implies (iv) is also immediate. Hence, it only remains to be
proved that (ii) implies (v).
Assume Ctp 6= ;: By Proposition 2, if A 2 F then (u(p;A); w(p;A)) 2 Ctp: Hence,
ui(p)  vtp(fig) for all i 2 B and
wk(p)  vtp(fkg) for all k 2 S.
By the denition of vtp,
'M(fig; (A;A); p) = ui(p;A) = vtp(fig) for all i 2 B and
'M(fkg; (A;A); p) = wk(p;A) = vtp(fkg) for all k 2 S.

The above proposition gives criteria and procedures to compute price vectors in
P t and therefore payo¤ vectors in CE t:
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5 Comparison and Relationships among Solutions
Our notation will facilitate us to compare the solutions and to show how the group
stability notions, the notions of competitive equilibria and the Core of a market are
related. We rst observe that for all C  B [ S,
FC(C)FC(C)  F3(C)F3(C)  F2(C)F2(C)  F1(C)F1(C)  F0  F 1.
Moreover, if (A;A) 2 F t(C)F t(C) then 'M(C; (A;A); p) = M(C;A; p): Hence, for
all p and all C ( B [ S,
v(C)  v3p(C)  v2p(C)  v1p(C)  v0p(C)  v 1p(C)
and
v(B [ S) = v3p(B [ S) = v2p(B [ S) = v1p(B [ S) = v0p(B [ S) = v 1p(B [ S):
Thus, for all p;
C  C3p  C2p  C1p  C0p  C 1p, (25)
and therefore,
if Ct0p 6= ;; then Ctp = Ct0p for t  t0: (26)
It is easy to describe markets for which there exists p such that C1p 6= ; and C0p = ;:
Now, we state a result showing that the set of payo¤s associated to all six solutions
are non-empty and have a strictly nested structure.
Theorem 4 Let M be a market. Then,
; 6= CE 1  CE0  GS1  GS2  GS3  C:
Proof By Corollary 4, (3), Theorems 1 and 3, and (25) it only remains to be proven
that the inclusion of CE0 in GS1 is strict. But Example 2 below will show that. 
Example 2 (continued) Consider p = (5; 4): Then, v1p(fb1; s1g) = 11, v1p(fb2; s1g) =
18; v1p(fs1g) = 8; v1p(fb1g) = 3; v1p(fb2g) = 10: Hence, (u(p;A); w(p;A)) =
(3; 10; 8) 2 C1p: Thus, (3; 10; 8) 2 GS1: But p =2 P0; since b1 would demand 8 units of
good 1: Moreover, (u(p; A); w(p; A)) = (3; 10; 8) if and only if p = (5; 4): That is,
(3; 10; 8) =2 CE0. 
Massó and Neme (2013) show that CE 1  GS1 using an alternative proof. More-
over, from the inclusion relationships established in Theorem 4, and by Theorems 1
and 3, we observe that all solutions have a similar structure because to compute the
payo¤ vectors in the solutions it is su¢ cient to identify the appropriated   (or p).
Namely,
GSt = f(u( ); w( )) j   2 Dtg for t = 1; 2; 3
and
CE t = f(u(p); w(p)) j p 2 P tg for t =  1; 0:
24
By Propositions 3 and 6, the elements in Dt and P t are solutions of a system of
non-strict lineal inequalities (the functions M and 'M are lineal and continuous in
  and p, respectively). Hence, a procedure to compute payo¤ vectors in GSt and CE t
is by solving the respective systems. In addition, the sets of solutions of such systems
are convex and closed. Thus, Dt and P t are convex and closed sets. But since the
functions (u( ); w( )) are lineal and continuos in  ; it follows that GSt and CE t are
convex and closed sets. Moreover, GSt and CE t are compact sets since GSt  C(M)
and CE t  C(M). Thus, the inclusions given in Theorem 4 constitute a chain of
nested convex sets.
6 Appendix
6.1 GS1 $ GS2 $ GS3 in Example 1
We want to show that GS1 $ GS2 $ GS3 holds for the market M of Example 1.
a) First, we will see that (u;w) = (11; 16; 6) 2 GS3nGS2: Let   =

5 2 4
17
3
3 1

and C  B [ S. We distinguish among ve di¤erent cases.
(I) If C = fs1g and bA 2 F t(C),
M(C; bA; ) = ( 111   r11)  bA111 + ( 121   r21)  bA121 + ( 131   r31)  bA131+
( 211   r11)  bA211 + ( 221   r21)  bA221 + ( 231   r31)  bA231
 0  A111 + 0  A121 + 3  A131 + 23  A211 + 1  A221 + 0  A231
= 0 + 0 + 2
3
 9
= w1:
(II) If C = fbig and bA 2 F t(C),
M(C; bA; ) = (vi1    i11)  bAi11 + (vi2    i21)  bAi21 + (vi3    i31)  bAi31
 (vi1    i11)  Ai11 + (vi2    i21)  Ai21 + (vi3    i31)  Ai31
= ui:
(III) If C = fb1; s1g and bA 2 F0,
M(C; bA; ) = (v11   r11)  bA111 + (v12   r21)  bA121 + (v13   r31)  bA131+
( 211   r11)  bA211 + ( 221   r21)  bA221 + ( 231   r31)  bA231
= 1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  bA211 + 1  bA221 + 0  bA231: (27)
If bA 2 F3(C), we have two possibilities:
(i) bA211 = bA221 = bA231 = 0; in which case,
M(C; bA; ) = 1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131
 1  4 + 2  5 + 3  1
= 17
 u1 + w1:
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(ii) bA211 = 9; bA221 = 0; bA231 = 1; in which case,
M(C; bA; ) = 1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  9 + 1  0 + 0  1
 1  1 + 2  5 + 3  0 + 2
3
 9 + 1  0 + 0  1
= 17
= u1 + w1:
(IV) If C = fb2; s1g and bA 2 F0,
M(C; bA; ) = (v21   r11)  bA211 + (v22   r21)  bA221 + (v23   r31)  bA231+
( 111   r11)  bA111 + ( 121   r21)  bA121 + ( 131   r31)  bA131
= 2  bA211 + 1  bA221 + 4  bA231 + 0  bA111 + 0  bA121 + 3  bA131:
If bA 2 F3(C), we have two possibilities:
(i) bA111 = bA121 = bA131 = 0; in which case,
M(C; bA; ) = 2  bA211 + 1  bA221 + 4  bA231
 2  9 + 1  0 + 4  1
= 22
 u2 + w1:
(ii) bA111 = 1; bA121 = 5; bA131 = 0; in which case,
M(C; bA; ) = 2  bA211 + 1  bA221 + 4  bA231 + 0  1 + 0  5 + 3  0
 2  9 + 1  0 + 4  1 + 0  1 + 0  5
= 22
= u2 + w1:
(V) If C = fb1; b1; s1g and bA 2 F3(C) then, M(C; bA; ) = T ( bA):Hence, M(C; bA; ) 
T (A) = u1 + u2 + w1.
Thus, we can conclude that for all C  B[S and all bA 2 F3(C); P
i2BC
ui+
P
k2SC
wk 
M(C; bA; ) holds. Hence, (11; 16; 6) 2 GS3:
We now check that (11; 16; 6) =2 GS2: Assume there exists  0 2 D such that for all
C  B [ S and all bA 2 F2(C);P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; 0) (28)
holds. Consider fb1; s1g  B[S and bA =  1 5 1
9 0 0

:Observe that bA 2 F2(fb1; s1g):
By (28),
M(fb1; s1g; bA; 0) = 1  1 + 2  5 + 3  1 + ( 0211   5)  9  11 + 6: (29)
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Now, consider fb2g  B [ S and A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

: Observe that A 2 F2(fb2g): By
(28),
M(fb2g; A; 0) = (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  1  16; (30)
and hence, by (29) and (30),
1 + 10 + 3 + ( 0211   5)  9 + (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  33;
which means that  0231  4: Consider now the assignment bA =  5 5 00 0 1

; and
observe that bA 2 F2(fb1; s1g): By (28),
M(fb1; s1g; bA; 0) = 5 + 10 + ( 0231   1)  6 + 11; (31)
and hence, by (31) and (30),
5 + 10 + ( 0231   1) + (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  33;
which means that  0231  499 : Finally, consider fs1g  B [ S and A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

:
Observe that A 2 F2(fs1g) and
M(fs1g; A; 0) = ( 0111   5)  1 + ( 0121   5)  5 + ( 0211   5)  9 + ( 0231   1)  1
 ( 0211   5)  9 + ( 0231   1)
 (49
9
  5)  9 + 4  1
= 7:
Hence, M(fs1g; A; 0)  7 > 6 = w1; which contradicts (28). Thus, (11; 16; 6) 2
GS3nGS2 holds.
b) Second, we will see that (u;w) = (11; 13; 9) 2 GS2nGS1: Let   =

6 4 4
17
3
3 4

and C  B[ S. We distinguish between two cases:
(I) If C  B[S, C 6= fb1; s1g and bA 2 F t(C), we can show using a similar argument
to the one used in case a) that M(C; bA; )  P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk holds as well.
(II) If C = fb1; s1g and bA 2 F0,
M(C; bA; ) = (v11   r11)  bA111 + (v12   r21)  bA121 + (v13   r31)  bA131+
( 211   r11)  bA211 + ( 221   r21)  bA221 + ( 231   r31)  bA231
= 1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  bA211 + 1  bA221 + 3  bA231: (32)
If bA 2 F2(C), we have three possibilities:
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(i) If bA231 = 1 and bA211 = 9;
M(C; bA; )  1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  9 + 1  0 + 3  1
 1 + 10 + 6 + 3
= 20
= u1 + w1:
(ii) If bA231 = 1 and bA211 = 0;
M(C; bA; )  1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  0 + 1  0 + 3  1
 1  5 + 10 + 3
= 18
 u1 + w1:
(iii) If bA231 = 0;
M(C; bA; ) = 1  bA111 + 2  bA121 + 3  bA131 + 23  bA211 + 1  0 + 3  0
= 1  bA111 + 2  5 + 3  0 + 23  bA211 + 1  0
 u1 + w1;
where the last inequality follows from what we have established in cases (i) and (ii)
above.
Thus, we can conclude that for all C  B[S and all bA 2 F2(C); P
i2BC
ui+
P
k2SC
wk 
M(C; bA; ) holds. Hence, (11; 13; 9) 2 GS2:
We now check that (11; 13; 9) =2 GS1: Assume there exists  0 2 D such that for all
C  B [ S and all bA 2 F1(C);P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  M(C; bA; 0) (33)
holds. Consider fb1; s1g  B[S and bA =  5 5 0
4 0 1

:Observe that bA 2 F1(fb1; s1g):
By (33);
M(fb1; s1g; bA; 0) = 1  5 + 2  5 + 3  0 + ( 0211   5)  4 + ( 0231   1)  1  11 + 9: (34)
Consider now fb2g  B [ S and A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

: Observe that A 2 F2(fb2g): By
(33);
M(fb2g; A; 0) = (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  1  13; (35)
and hence, by (34) and (35),
5 + 10 + ( 0211   5)  4 + ( 0231   1)  1 + (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  33;
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which means that  0211  6: Consider now the assignment bA =  1 5 19 0 0

: Observe
that bA 2 F1(fb1; s1g) and
M(fb1; s1g; bA; 0) = 1 + 10 + 3 + ( 0211   5)  9  11 + 9: (36)
Hence, by (36) and (35),
1 + 10 + 3 + ( 0211   5)  9 + (7   0211)  9 + (5   0231)  33;
which means that  0231  4: Finally, consider fs1g  B [ S and A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

:
Observe that A 2 F2(fs1g) and
M(fs1g; A; 0) = ( 0111   5)  1 + ( 0121   5)  5 + ( 0211   5)  9 + ( 0231   1)  1
 ( 0211   5)  9 + ( 0231   1)
 (6  5)  9 + 4  1
= 12:
Hence, M(fs1g; A; 0)  12 > 9 = w1; which contradicts (33). Thus, (11; 13; 9) 2
GS2nGS1:
c) To nish, we will exhibit a vector in GS1: Let (u;w) = (0; 0; 33),   =

6 4 4
7 3 5

and C  B[ S. We distinguish between two cases.
(I) If C  B then, M(C; bA; ) = 0 holds for all bA 2 F1(C): Hence, M(C; bA; ) P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk.
(II) If s1 2 C and bA 2 F1(C) then, M(C; bA; )  TM( bA)  33 (since bA 2 F0 holds).
Hence,
M(C; bA; )  33 = w1 = P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk;
which means that (u;w) = (0; 0; 33) 2 GS1:
6.2 Ct  = ; in Example 1
Remember that the unique optimal assignment in the market of Example 1 is A =
1 5 0
9 0 1

with TM (A) = 33. Let   =

6 4 4
17
3
3 4

: By Remark 1, v1 (fb1; b2; s1g) =
33: Observe that bA =  5 5 0
4 0 1

2 F1(fb1; s1g); thus
vt (fb1; s1g)  M(fb1; s1g; bA; ) = 5 + 10 +  173   5  4 + (4  1)  1 = 623 :
Now, consider fb2g: We have A =

1 5 0
9 0 1

2 F1(fb2g); thus
vt (fb2g)  M(fb2g; A; ) = (7  173 )  9 + (5  4)  1 = 13:
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Therefore, v1 (fb1; s1g) + v1 (fb2g)  623 + 13 = 1013 > 33 = v1 (fb1; b2; s1g); where
we deduce that the game (B [ S; v1 ) has empty Core.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We rst prove the statement in Lemma 2 for t =  1: For this purpose we will use the
following notation. Fix p 2 RG+: Dene for every i 2 B
i(p) =

vij   pj if there exists j 2 r>i (p)
0 otherwise,
(37)
and for every (j; k) 2 G  S
jk (p) =

pj   rjk if pj   rjk > 0
0 otherwise.
(38)
The number i(p) is the net valuation obtained by buyer i from each unit of the goods
that he wants to buy at p and the number jk(p) is the net gain obtained by seller k
from each unit of good j that he want to sell at p.
Let (AB; AS) 2 F 1. Since (p;A) is a -1 equilibrium, for each i 2 B,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk = i(p)  di:
But di 
P
jk A
B
ijk and (vij   pj)  i(p) for all j: Hence, for each i 2 B,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk 
P
jk
(vij   pj)  ABijk:
Thus, (19) holds. The proof that (20) holds as well proceeds similarly and therefore
it is omitted.
To prove the other implication, consider a pair (p;A) satisfying (19) and (20) for
all (AB; AS) 2 F 1. We will show that (p;A) is a -1-competitive equilibrium.
First, we will check that (E.D) holds. Since A is feasible, (D.a) and (D.b) hold.
To check that (D.c) holds assume that for i 2 B, r>i (p) 6= ;. We want to
show that
P
j2r>i (p)
P
k Ajk = di: Assume there exists i
0 such that r>i0 (p) 6= ; butP
j2r>
i0 (p)
P
k Ai0jk < di0 : Let j
0 2 r>i0 (p) and let AB be such that
P
k
ABi0jk =

di0 if j = j0
0 if j 6= j0:
It is clear that (AB; AS) 2 F 1 for some AS: Now we have thatPjk(vi0j pj) ABi0jk =
i0(p)  di0 : We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1:
P
jk Ai0jk < di0. Then,P
jk
(vi0j   pj)  ABi0jk = i0(p)  di0 > i0(p) 
P
jk
Ai0jk 
P
jk
(vi0j   pj)  Ai0jk;
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which contradicts (19).
Case 2:
P
jk Ai0jk = di0 : Then,P
jk
(vi0j   pj)  ABi0jk = i0(p)  di0  i0(p) 
P
j
P
k Ai0jk
= i0(p)  (
P
j2r>
i0 (p)
P
k Ai0jk) + i0(p)  (
P
j =2r>
i0 (p)
P
k Ai0jk)
>
P
j2r>
i0 (p)
P
k(vi0j   pj)  Ai0jk +
P
j =2r>
i0 (p)
(vi0j   pj) 
P
k Ai0jk
=
P
jk(vi0j   pj)  Ai0jk;
which contradicts (19).
To check that (D.d) holds, assume that for i 2 B,Pk Aijk > 0. We want to show
that j 2 ri (p). Assume there exist i0 2 B, j0 2 G and k0 2 S such that Ai0j0k0 > 0;
but j0 =2 ri0 (p): Dene
ABijk =

Aijk if (i; j; k) 6= (i0; j0; k0)
0 if (i; j; k) = (i0; j0; k0):
We have that (AB; AS) 2 F 1 for some AS and in addition,P
jk
(vi0j   pj)  ABi0jk =
P
jk:
(j;k) 6=(j0;k0)
(vi0j   pj)  Ai0jk >
P
jk
(vi0j   pj)  Ai0jk:
Hence, (p;A) does not satisfy (19). Thus, (E.D) holds.
Proceeding similarly, we can check that (E.S) holds, since for (p;A) to satisfy (20),
it is necessary that each seller k 2 S sells all the units he owns of each good that
produce a strict positive net gain and no unit of the goods producing negative net
gains.
We now proceed to prove Lemma 2 for the case t = 0: For this purpose we will
use the following notation. Fix p 2 RG+ and j 2 rz>i (p) for z = 1; :::; J; dene
zi(p) = (vij   pj): Moreover, if rz>i (p) = ; dene zi(p) = 0. Let (p;A) be a
0 competitive equilibrium and assume there exist i 2 B and A 2 F0 such thatP
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk >
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk:
If (vij   pj) < 0; then Aijk = 0 for all k since (p;A) is a 0 competitive equilibrium.
Hence,P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk +
P
j =2[rt>i (p)
k2S
(vij   pj)  Aijk =
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk
>
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk
=
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk:
31
Then, since
P
j =2[rz>i (p)
k2S
(vij   pj)  Aijk  0 holds,
P
z=1;:::;J
it(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk >
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk: (39)
Assume
P
j2r1>i (p) k
Aijk >
P
j2r1>i (p) k
Aijk: Since A and A are feasible, r1>i (p) 6= ; andP
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk <
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk  d1i: Then, A(i) =2 Di(p): Hence,
P
j2r1>i (p)
k2S
Aijk 
P
j2r1>i (p)
k2S
Aijk: (40)
Let z be the minimum z = 1; :::; J such that
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk >
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk
(z exists by (39) and (40)). Clearly, rz>i (p) 6= ;: Thus,P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;z
dit:
We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1:
P
z=1;:::;z
dzi = di. Then,
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk > di; which contradicts that A

is feasible.
Case 2:
P
z=1;:::;z
dzi < di: Then, dzi = minfdi 
Pz 1
m=1 dmi;
P
j2rz>i (p)Qjg =
P
j2rz>i (p)Qj
for all z = 1; :::; z:Hence,
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rt>i (p)
k2S
Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)Qj: Thus,
P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk >P
z=1;:::;z
P
j2rz>i (p)Qj; which again contradicts that A
 is feasible.
The fact that
P
ij(pj   rjk) Aijk 
P
ij(pj   rjk) Aijk holds for all k 2 S; can be
deduced similarly.
To verify that the other implication holds as well, assume that the pair (p;A) sat-
ises (19) and (20) for all feasible A. We want to show that (p;A) is a 0 competitive
equilibrium. First, we check that (E.D0) holds. Since A is feasible, (D.a0) and (D.b0)
hold.
To check that (D.c) holds, assumerz>i (p) 6= ;. We want to show that
P
j2rz>i (p)
P
k Ajk =
dzi: Assume there exist i0 and z such that rz>i0 (p) 6= ; butP
j2rz>
i0 (p)
P
k
Ai0jk < di0z : (41)
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
P
j2rz>
i0 (p)
P
k Ajk = dzi0 holds for all
z < z:We have dzi0 
P
j2rz>
i0 (p)
Qj: By (41), there exist k 2 S and j 2 rz>i0
such that Ai0jk < qjk : We distinguish between two cases.
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Case 1:
P
jk
Ai0jk < di0 : Dene A as follows:
Aijk =
8>>><>>>:
Aijk if i = i0; j 2 rz>i (p) for some z < z or z < z for all k
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j and k = k
Aijk if i = i0; j 2 rz>i (p), j 6= j and k 6= k
0 otherwise.
We have that A is feasible. Moreover,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk >
P
z=;1:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk
 P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk;
which contradicts (19).
Case 2:
P
jk
Ai0jk = di0 : Then, by (41), there exist ~z > z; ~j 2 G and ~k 2 S such that
~j 2 r~z>i0 (p) and Ai0~j~k > 0: Now dene A as follows:
Aijk =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Aijk if i = i0; j 2 rz>i (p) for some z < z and for all k
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j and k = k
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = ~j and k = ~k
Aijk if i = i0; j 2 rt>i (p) and (j; k) 6= (j; k)
Aijk i = i
0; j 2 rz>i (p) for some z > z and (j; k) 6= (~j; ~k).
0 otherwise.
It is immediate to check that A is feasible. Moreover,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk >
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2S
Aijk
 P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk:
which contradicts (19).
To check that (D.d0) holds, assume
P
k Aijk > 0. We want to show that j 2 ri (p)
for all i 2 B. Assume there exist i0 2 B and j0 2 G such that Pk Ai0j0k > 0 but
j0 =2 ri0 (p): Dene
Aijk =
8<:
0 if i = i0 and j =2 ri0 (p) for all k 2 S
Aijk if i = i0 and j 2 rz>i (p) for some z for all k 2 S
0 otherwise.
It is immediate to check that A is feasible. Moreover,P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2B
Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;J
zi(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
k2B
Aijk
>
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk;
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which contradicts (19). Namely, (E.D0) holds.
Now we check that (E.S0) holds. That is, for each seller k 2 S; (PiAijk)j 2
S0k (p) : Since A is feasible, (S.a0) and (S.b0) holds.
To check that (S.c0) holds, assume rz>k (p) 6= ; for some z = 1; :::; J . We want to
show that
P
j2rz>i (p) j = szk(p). Assume there exist k
0 and z such that rz>k0 (p) 6=
; but for z = 1; :::; J; P
j2rz>
i0 (p)
P
i
Aijk0 < szk0(p): (42)
Without loss of generality we may assume that
P
j2rz>
k0 (p)
P
iAijk0 = szk0(p) for all
z < z: We have szk0(p)  minf
P
j2rtz>
k0 (p)
qjk0 ; D  
Pz 1
m=1 smk0(p)g: Then, by (42),
P
j2rz>
i0 (p)
P
i
Aijk0 < D  
z 1X
m=1
smk0(p) = D  
z 1X
m=1
P
j2rm>
k0 (p)
P
i
Aijk0 :
Hence,
Pz
n=1
P
j2rn>
k0 (p)
P
iAijk0 < D: Thus,
P
i2B
Pz
n=1
P
j2rn>
k0 (p)
Aijk0 <
P
i2B di:
Then, there exists i 2 B such that Pzn=1Pj2rn>
k0 (p)
Aijk0 < di : Moreover, by (42),
we know
P
j2rz>
k0 (p)
P
iAijk0 <
P
j2rz>
k0 (p)
qjk0 : Then, there exists j 2 rz>k0 such
that
P
iAijk0 < qjk0 : Dene A
 as follows:
Aijk =
8>>><>>>:
Aijk if k = k0 and j 2 rz>k (p) for some z < z or z < z for all i
Aijk + 1 if i = i; j = j and k = k0
Aijk if i = i0; j 2 rz>i (p), j 6= j and k 6= k
0 otherwise.
It is immediate to check that A is feasible. Moreover,P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk =
P
z=1;:::;J
zk(p)
P
j2rz>k (p)
i2B
Aijk
>
P
z=1;:::;J
zk(p)
P
j2rz>i (p)
i2B
Aijk 
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk;
which contradicts (20).
The proof that (S.d0) holds as well is similar, and therefore omitted. 
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